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COMMENTS
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE-THE DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
AND THE DEATH OF MAKI
It is a maxim among these lawyers that whatever hath been done before may
legally be done again: and therefore they take special care to record all the de-
cisions formerly made against justice and the good reason of mankind. These,
under the name of precedents, they produce as authorities to justify the most
iniquitous opinions: and the judges never fail of directing accordingly.
Jonathan Swift, Gulliver's Travels
On July 26, 1967, the Illinois Appellate Court for the Second District,
at what must be considered the open invitation of the Illinois Supreme
Court to abolish the doctrine of contributory negligence, was directed to
determine "whether, as a matter of justice and public policy, the rule should
be changed."' Upon this mandate, the appellate court in the case of Maki v.
Frelk2 held that contributory negligence shall no longer bar recovery, and
adopted instead a Wisconsin-type rule of comparative negligence. On peti-
tions by the plaintiff for clarification of the operation of comparative negli-
gence and by the defendant for review, the Illinois Supreme Court timidly
reconsidered its hasty transfer and held "that such a far-reaching change
if desirable should be made by the legislature."13 In handing down such a
decision, the majority lost sight of sound reasoning and obvious facts: it ig-
nored arguments of the gross injustice of the contributory negligence bar; it
ignored the flagrant fact that our legislature, the instrument of "far reaching
changes," had rejected nine ieform bills, eight of which had been tabled in
committee. 4 The court chose to disregard the situation it had apparently been
cognizant of in transferring cause-that the legislature because of factious
1 In transferring cause to the appellate court, the supreme court said, "In our opinion
such a claim [referring to the appellant's arguments] does not give rise to a constitutional
question of such a nature as to give this Court jurisdiction on direct appeal. There re-
mains for consideration the question of whether, as a matter of justice and public policy,
the rule should be changed," Maki v. Frelk, 85 I1. App. 2d 439, 440, 229 N.E.2d. 284, 285
(1967).
2 85 Ill. App. 2d 439, 229 N.E.2d 284 (1967).
3 Maki v. Frelk, 239 N.E.2d 445, 447 (Ill. 1968).
4S.B. 158 (1937); H.B. 555 (1939); S.B. 5i3 (1955); H1.B. 755 (1955); S.B. 551
(1957); H.B. 1960 (1957); H.B. 1140 (1959); S.B. 374 (1963); H.B. 636 (1965).
This last bill had the support of the Illinois Judicial Conference and its Committee
on Comparative Negligence.
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makeup and certain lobbies was incapable of reforming the law, and that there-
fore, the duty to change, alter or abolish this judge-made rule devolved clearly
and squarely upon the court. It is certainly sad commentary that, cloaked in
a new guise of court-enforced legislative fiat, Gulliver's maxim of stare decisis
should become a twentieth century reality.
Notwithstanding Maki, eight states presently follow a form of comparative
negligence in general negligence actions. 5 Comparative negligence, or as it
has been more aptly termed, damage apportionment,6 has been for the past
century the dialectical nemesis of contributory negligence. Although the
controversy had apparently subsided since 1955, 7 the incidence of the Maki
case and certain other recent developments point toward a resurgence of
that theory in the law of negligence.
This comment will discuss the history and development of comparative
negligence, including its present status in various jurisdictions, and endeavor
to predict the future of the doctrine, particularly, whether the concept of
comparative negligence represents a permanent stage in the evolution of
negligence law or merely a transient stop on the way to compensation without
regard to fault.
HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
Inasmuch as the history of comparative negligence is often read as the
demise of the doctrine of contributory negligence, or alternatively, the con-
cept of liability based on fault, any discussion of the former must include
also the latter two.
5 Eight states, Puerto Rico and the Canal Zone followed a form of comparative
negligence in general actions. All but one, Tennessee, had adopted comparative negligence
by statute. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-1730.1,-.2 (1962); GA. CODE §§ 105-603 (1956) &
94-703 (1968); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14 § 156 (Supp. 1967); Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 1454 (1957); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1151 (1964); S.D. CODE § 47.0301-1 (Supp.
1960); WIs. STAT. § 895.045 (1966); C.Z. Civil Code, para. 977 (Canal Zone) (1934);
P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 31, § 5141 (Puerto Rico) (Supp. 1957); Tennessee, Nashville &
Chattanooga R.R. Co. v. Carroll, 53 Tenn. 347 (1871); Anderson v. Carter, 22 Tenn.
App. 118, 118 S.W.2d 892 (1937).
6 Dean Prosser points out that the modern use of the term "comparative negligence"
is something of a misnomer. The term as it was used in its early history in Illinois
(discussed infra) was associated with degrees of negligence and a comparison of "slight,"
"ordinary," and "gross," and did not involve, whether recovery was allowed or not,
diminution of recoverable damages. Prosser suggests a better name for the modern con-
cept of comparative negligence which contemplates both a comparison of causal negli-
gence and a corresponding diminution of damages would be "damage apportionment" or
"comparative damages." Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 MicH. L. REv. 465, n2
(1953).
7The decade that followed the enactment of the original Arkansas statute (infra
note 72) saw no further adoption of the comparative negligence rule in the other states.
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The concept of fault is today the fundamental basis of negligence law.
The law speaks in terms of legal duty and objective standards of care.
Nevertheless, a category of negligent wrongs was completely foreign to
the early common law. Liability for wrongdoing in Anglo-Saxon times
represented a natural substitute for the vendetta or blood feud. The feud
was bought off by composition, even though the injury was purely accidental,
or inflicted in self defense.8 After the reign of Edward IV, the notion of
proximate cause often crept into cases, and by the seventeenth century, the
constant inquiry into the foreseeability of consequential injury gradually
gave rise to the idea that liability was grounded upon negligence. 9 By the
eighteenth century, it was generally recognized that where an injury was
unintended, in the absence of negligence, there should be no liability.'0
Butterfield v. Forrester
Although the vague outlines of the doctrine of contributory negligence were
discernible in a few earlier decisions where the plaintiff was denied recovery
because he was the sole cause of his own injury, causal negligence on the
part of a plaintiff was not held to bar recovery until Butterfield v. Forrester."
The plaintiff, riding home at dusk carelessly rode into a pole which the de-
fendant negligently had left projecting on to the road. Lord Edinborough,
speaking for the court held:
A party is not to cast himself upon an obstruction which has been made by fault
of another, and avail himself of it, if he does not himself use common and ordinary
caution. . . .One person being at fault will not dispense with another's using
ordinary care for himself. Two things must concur to support this action, an
obstruction in the road by the fault of the defendant, and no want of ordinary
care to avoid it on the part of the plaintiff.12
The analogy of the plaintiff casting "himself upon an obstruction" and
the facility with which the court addresses itself to the problem, seems to
emphasize the fact that the judges felt they were dealing with the familiar
question of proximate causation rather than enunciating a new doctrine.' 3
8 Hou mEs, THE COMMON LAW, 1-3 (1881); 3 HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW 50-52 (3d. ed. 1923); TURK, iComparative Negligence on the March, 28 CHR-KENT
L. REV. 189, 191-197 (1950).
9 HoLnsworTH, id. at 379-80, 449-452.
10 8 HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 452 (3d ed. 1926).
11 11 East 60, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (K.B. 1809).
121d. at 61, 103 Eng. Rep. at 927.
13 Many later cases seem to use the same line of reasoning. For example, in the case of
Thomas v. Quartermaine, 18 Q.D.B. 685, 687, 56 L.J. Rep. N.S. 340, 349 (1887), the
court asserts that the plaintiff's act having "severed the causal connection between the
defendant's negligence and the acddent, . . . the defendant's negligence accordingly
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The rule of Butterfield v. Forrester was readily accepted 14 by the courts
in England and the United States,15 which often spoke of the doctrine as
having al*ays been part and parcel of the common law. 16 This rapid assimila-
tion coincided with the industrial revolution, a period when the economic
needs of fledgling industries demanded such financial protection. The doc-
trine of contributory negligence, the fellow-servant rule, and voluntary
assumption of risk served to limit the liability of infant industries; and at
the same time provided a convenient means of controlling the distrusted,
plaintiff-minded jury.17
Admiralty
Admiralty had from the beginning charted a different course in regard to
contributory fault. As early as the thirteenth century, the laws of Oleron, a
small island off the west coast of France, declared that if two ships collide
on the high seas, the total damages should be shared equally when it was
impossible to fix the blame for the collision. 18 England adopted a similar
is not the true proximate cause of the injury." James and other writers suggest that this
sort of reasoning was strongly influenced by the medieval concept of causation which
regarded the act closest in physical and chronological proximity as the singular cause.
James, Contributory Negligence, 62 YALE L.J. 691, 693, 696 (1953); Philbrick, Loss Ap-
portionment in Negligence Cases, 99 U. PA. L. REV. 572, 574 (1951); Turk, supra note 8,
at 197.
14 Two notable exceptions are Raisin v. Mitchell, 9 Cor. & P. 613, 173 Eng. Rep. 979
(1839); Lynch v. Nurdin, 1 Q.B. 29, 113 Eng. Rep. 1041 (1841).
15 Smith v. Smith, 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 621 (1824); Noyes v. Morristown, 1 Vt. 353
(1828) ; Aurora Branch R.R. Co. v. Grimes, 13 Ill. 585 (1852).
16 See, e.g., Railroad Co. v. Aspell, 23 Pa. 147, 149 (1854).
17 PROSSER, LAW Or TORTS § 64, at 428 (3d ed. 1964); Green, The Individual's Pro-
tection Under Negligence Law: Risk Acceptance, 47 Nw. U.L. REV. 751, 753 (1953);
Malone, the Formative Era of Contributory Negligence, 41 ILL. L. REv. 151 (1946).
Whatever functional motives the courts might have either consciously or unconsciously
had for espousing the doctrine of contributory negligence, they expressed the following
rationales in justifying its use: (a) The plaintiff is precluded from recovery because his
contributory negligence has "severed" or "insulated" the defendant's negligence from the
injury. Thomas v. Quartermaine, supra note 13; PROSSER, supra, § 64, at 427; HARPER AND
JAMES, TiAE LAW OF TORTS, § 22.2 (1956). (b) The court will not aid a party who was
himself in the wrong. Davis v. Guarnieri, 45 Ohio St. 470, 15 N.E. 350; Prosser, supra,
§ 64. (c) The doctrine will deter individuals from being careless. Schofield, Davies v.
Mann: Theory of Contributory Negligence, 3 HARV. L. REV. 263, 270 (1890). (d) The
plaintiff is barred under the maxim volenti non fit injuria. (i.e., By his own negligence,
the plaintiff tacitly consents to all consequential iesults, and thus, in a sense, "assumes
the risk" of the potential results of his own carelessness.) Prosser, supra, § 64; HARPER
D JAMES, supra, § 22.2. (e) The mutuality of wrong involved would entitle each party
alike, if they both were injured, to an action against the other, but it is impractical, if
not impossible to apportion damages. Thus it is the policy of the law to leave the parties
exactly as it found them. Bellefonte Ind. Ry. v. Snyder, 18 Ohio St. 339, 409 (1868)
HARPER AND JAMES, supra, § 22.2.
18 MARSDEN, CoiLlIsioNs AT SEA 135 (8th ed. 1923); Turk, supra note 8, at 226.
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rule of equal division in cases where the libellant was contributorily negli-
gent.19 The time honored rusticum judicium was applied in cases of mutual
fault until 1911 when a statute modeled after the rule of the Brussel's Mari-
time Convention was enacted. 20 Although all other important maritime
nations presently follow some form of the Brussel's Convention rule, which
provides for apportionment of loss according to the proportion of fault,
the United States continues to cling to the rule of equal division of damages.21
AMELIORATION OF THE "HARSH" RULE OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
Last Clear Chance. The courts have developed certain limitations on the
applications of the rule of contributory negligence. In 1842, the English
case of Davies v. Mann22 held that a plaintiff, though negligent, may recover
where the defendant, in the exercise of due care, might have avoided the
injury. While the so-called doctrine of last-clear-chance merely shifts the
entire burden of loss from the negligent plaintiff to a defendant whose negli-
gence followed that of the plaintiff, it has been consistently applied in situa-
tions of discovered or discoverable peril in the guise of a rule of proximate
cause.
23
19 Beckman v. Chapman, Ad. Ct. Ass. Book, Jan. 20, 1695; Noden v. Ashton, libels
File 128, No. 250, Ass. Book, June 20, 1706. Both cases noted in MARSDEN, supra note 18,
at 159-160.
20 English Maritime Act, 1 and 2 Geo. 5, c. 57, § 1 (1911).
21 Where two vessels both at fault are involved in a collision, apportionment of damages
in an admiralty proceeding brought by one vessel against the other is normally made by
totaling the entire loss in one common mass and dividing such loss equally between the
two vessels regardless of their respective degrees of fault. The Victory, 68 F. 400, 15
C.CA. 490 (C.C.A., Va.); United States v. Atlantic Mutual Insurance Company, 343
U.S. 236 (1952); Ahlgren v. Red Star Towing and Transport Company Inc., 214 F.2d
618 (2d Cir. 1954). But see, N.H. Patterson & Sons, Ltd. v. City of Chicago, 209 F. Supp.
576 (N.D. Ill. 1962); 46 MARQ. L. REV. 532 (1963). See 11 U. FLA. L. REv. 98 (1958),
wherein the special set of exceptions which have developed in the United States in order
to prevent the harsh results of a strict application of the division of damages rule is
discussed.
22 10 M & W. 546, 152 Eng. Rep. 588 (1842).
23 (a) Discovered Peril: The plaintiff was negligent in placing himself in a situation of
peril, but the defendant, realizing the danger, by the exercise of reasonable care could
have avoided the injury. New York Central R.R. v. Thompson, 215 Ind. 652, 21 N.E.2d
625 (1939). PROSSER, supra note 17, § 65 at 439-40; HARPER AND JAMEaS, supra note 17,
§§ 22.12, 22.13 at 1241-1255. (b) Discoverable Peril: The plaintiff was negligent in placing
himself in a situation of peril, but the defendant in the exercise of reasonable precaution
would have realized the danger and then, by exercising due care avoided the injury.
Storr v. New York Cent. R.R., 261 N.Y. 348, 185 N.E. 407 (1933). PROSSER, supra note
17, at 440; HARPER AND JAMES, supra note 17, at 1241-55. On the point that the doctrine
of last clear chance is merely a judicial 'freaction formation" td the strict application
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Recklessness. Since action characterized as "wilful," "wanton," or "reckless"
misconduct is said to be qualitatively more grievous than negligence, con-
noting a "quasi intent, '2 4 the courts have, by extension of the rule relating
to intentional torts, unanimously held that contributory negligence is no de-
fense to a claim for an injury caused by "wilful," "wanton," or "reckless"
misconduct.2 5
Burden of Proof. Another palliation of otherwise denied recovery was the
gradual changes in the rules of pleading and burden of proof regarding con-
tributory negligence. Today, the great majority of the common law jurisdic-
tions consider contributory negligence an affirmative defense.26
Absolute Liability. In a more indirect way, the absolute liability imposed
under various statutes and the case law rule of strict liability for ultrahazar-
dous activities also limits the application of contributory negligence.27
Informal Jury Apportionment. Perhaps the most pervasive amelioration of
the contributory negligence bars occurs whenever a negligence case gets to the
of the contributory negligence bar, see MacIntyre, The Rationale of Last Clear Chance,
53 HARv. L. REV. 1225, 1226, 1251 (1940) wherein the author asserts that the whole last
clear chance doctrine is only a disguised escape by way of comparative fault from con-
tributory negligence as an actual bar. A recent case before the Maine Supreme Court
reinforces this position. Positing that "the appearance and survival of the last clear
chance doctrine is best explained by a frequently occurring dissatisfaction in the courts
with the result of the contributory negligence rule," the court concludes "that the last
clear chance doctrine is but a modification of the doctrine of contributory negligence,"
and therefore, when the Maine legislature enacted comparative negligence (infra notes
95-96, notes and text), "the last clear chance rule disappeared with contributory negli-
gence and no longer exists as an absolute rule." Cushman v. Perkins, 37 U.S.L.W. 2197
(Me. Sup. Ct. Sept. 20, 1968).
24 PRossER, supra note 17, § 34 at 188.
25 Heideneich v. Bremner, 260 Ill. 439, 103 N.E. 275 (1913); Yelinich v. Capalongo,
38 Ill. App. 2d 199, 186 (N.E.2d 777 (1962) ; HARPER AND JAMES, supra note 17, § 22.6
at 1213-15.
26 Only Illinois, New York, Michigan, Iowa, Maine and Rhode Island still adhere to
the "barbaric rule," placing the burden of pleading and proving freedom from contributory
negligence on the plaintiff. Maine and New York have eliminated this rule in actions
under their death statutes. HARPER AND JAMES, supra note 17, § 22.11 at 1235-36; PROSSER,
supra note 17, § 64 at 426; Institute of Judicial Administration, Comparative Negligence,
3-UII (1955); Green, Illinois Negligence Law 11, 39 ILL. L. REV. 116, 125-130 (1944).
A line of Illinois cases has recognized in death cases the presumption that the decedent
obeyed "the natural human instincts prompting the preservation of life and avoidance
of danger." Campbell v. Ragel, 7 11. App. 2d 301, 304, 129 N.E.2d 451, 452 (1955) ; Ill.
Cent. R.R. v. Nowicki, 148 Ill. 29, 35 N.E. 358 (1893); Elgin, Joliet & E. R.R. v.
Hoadley, 122 Ill. App. 165, aff'd, 220 Ill. 462, 77 N.E. 151 (1906). This presumption of
a natural instinct of self preservation, in effect, reverses the burden of proving contribu-
tory negligence in certain death cases. The anomaly apparent is that the plaintiff only
injured or maimed is presumed in Illinois to have had no such instinct.
27HARPER AND JAMES, supra note 17, § 22.7 at 1216-19, § 22.9, 1227; Symposium,
Illinois Statutory Remedies for Personal Injury or Death, 1967 U. ILL. L.F. 1-116.
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jury. Juries frequently refuse to find contributory negligence and instead
bring in a compromised verdict.28 In at least one state, this propensity of
juries has received official recognition. 29 The jury's "instinctive" sense of
comparative fault has been used repeatedly in arguments both for and against
a system of comparative negligence.30
THE ILLINOIS EXPERIMENT: THE "COMPARATIVE DEGREES" OF
NEGLIGENCE THEORY
During the nineteenth century, Illinois, Kansas, and Tennessee developed
a species of common law comparative negligence.3 1 In 1852, the Illinois
28See Haeg v. Sprague, Warner & Co., 202 Minn. 425, 430, 281 N.W. 261, 263 (1938);
Karcesky v. Laria, 382 Pa. 227, 114 A.2d 150, 154 (1955). In a survey of fifty-three
Chicago-area trial lawyers taken for this paper, 89% of the respondents answered that
such informal jury apportionment was a very common experience. See also, MARGARiCx,
SUCCESSFUL HANDLING OF CASUALTY CIMI.S 18 (1955); Burns, Comparative Negli-
gence: A Law Professor Dissents, 51 ILL. BAR. J. 708, 717 (1963); Gilmore, Com-
parative Negligence from a Viewpoint of Causalty Insurance, 10 ARK. L. REV. 82,
83 (1955); PROSSER, supra note 6, at 469. See Siegel, Silent Growth of Comparative
Negligence in Common Law Courts, 12 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 462 (1963) for an excellent
discussion of the growth sub rosa of comparative negligence through the jury system.
29 The Pennsylvania courts have established that a plaintiff's motion for a new trial,
based on the inadequacy of the damages may be denied on the ground that evidence of
contributory negligence may have been used by the jury in returning an otherwise un-
justifiably small verdict. O'Toole, Comparative Negligence; The Pennsylvania Proposal,
2 VILL L. REV. 474 (1957). See Karcesky v. Laria, 382 Pa. 227, 114 A.2d 150 (1955);
Patterson v. Palley Mfg. Co., 360 Pa. 259, 61 A.2d 861 (1948); Carpenelli v. Scranton
Bus. Co., 350 Pa. 184, 38 A.2d 44 (1944).
80 Pro: Philbrick, Loss Apportionment in Negligence Cases, 99 U. PA. L. REV. 766, 803
(1951); Maloney, From Contributory to Comparative Negligence: A Needed Law Re-
form, 11 U. FLA. L. REV. 135, 151 (1958); Gair, The Contributory Negligence Rule: An
Offense to Justice, 35 N.Y.S.B.J. 392, 395; Comment, 30 Mo. L. REV. 137, 138 (1965);
Comment, 1967 U. ILL. L.F. 351, 354-356. Con: Body, Comparative Negligence: The
Views of a Trial Lawyer, 44 A.B.A.J. 346, 347 (1958); Powell, Contributory Negligence:
A Necessary Check in the American Jury, 43 A.B.A.J. 1005, 1006 (1957).
31 The Kansas view was in substance the same as Illinois' allowing recovery where
plaintiff's negligence was slight or remote and the defendant's was gross or a proximate
cause in comparison. Sawyer v. Sauer, 10 Kans. 351 (1872); abandoned in A.T. &
S.F. R.R. v. Morgan, 31 Kan. 77, 1 P. 298 (1883). The Tennessee version, which is still
followed today, has been called the "doctrine of remote contributory negligence." The
courts have consistently held that contributory negligence which is a proximate cause
of the injury bars recovery, but where the plaintiff's negligence contributed only remotely
to his injuries, such negligence will be considered only for purposes of apportionment
and mitigation of damages. The Supreme Court of Tennessee had expressly rejected the
modern doctrine of comparative negligence, and in practical operation the Tennessee
doctrine has operated only in situations where the defendant had a last clear chance.
Ironically, in most states, so-called "remote contributory negligence" has no effect on re-
covery. Nash. & Chat. R.R. v. Carroll, 53 Tenn. 284 (1871); Whirley v. Whiteman, 38
Tenn. 610 (1858); East Tennessee, V. & G. Ry. v. Hull, 88 Tenn. 33, 12 S.W. 419
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Supreme Court recognized the rule of Butterfield v. Forrester and placed the
burden of proving freedom from contributory negligence upon the plaintiff.8 2
Six years later, 8 Justice Breese, while giving lip service to Butterfield, found
that "the question of liability does not depend absolutely on the absence of
all negligence on the part of the plaintiff, but upon the relative degree of care
or want of care, as manifested by both. 's 4
[T]he more gross the negligence manifested by the defendant, the less degree of
care will be required of the plaintiff to enable him to recover. . . [I]n all cases,
the degrees of negligence must be measured and considered, and wherever ...
the plaintiff's negligence is comparatively slight, and that of the defendant gross,
he shall not be deprived of his action.8 5
Thus it was established, and for three decades held, that in cases of mutual
fault, a plaintiff had to demonstrate he had taken ordinary precaution for his
safety; but if he had done so and was guilty of only slight negligence in
comparison, he was entitled to recover.36 The constricting ambits of ordinary
care and slight negligence delimited the application of the doctrine to a rather
narrow area and as a result, the definitions of "slight" and "gross" were a
constant source of appellate litigation.8 7 In 1894, the theory of "comparative
degrees" was unequivocally abandoned by the Illinois Supreme Court in Lake
Shore and Michigan Southern Railway v. Hessions.8s A number of factors
appear to have contributed to the downfall of the "comparative degree
theory," primary among them the following: (1) the difficulty of defining
degrees of negligence as slight, gross, or ordinary lead to an overburdening
of the appellate courts and doctrinal confusion; (2) the impossibility of re-
(1889); Prosser, supra note 6, 485-486, 497; Turk, supra note 8, 313-17. Louisiana
enacted a general comparative negligence statute which existed until 1950, but the
Louisiana courts nevertheless consistently ignored the statute, and applied instead the rule
of contributory negligence. Turk, supra note 8, at 317-26.
32 Aurora Branch R.R. v. Grimes, 13 IUl. 585 (1852). See Chicago & Miss. R.R. v.
Patchin, 16 Ill. 197 (1854).
83 Galena and Chicago Union R.R. v. Jacobs, 20 II. 478 (1858).
34 Id. at 496. The court relies on the cases cited supra note 14.
35 Id. at 497.
86 Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Middlesworth, 43 Ill. 64 (1867) ; Chicago, Minn. & St.P. Ry. v.
Mason, 27 Ill. App. 450 (1888)
87 "For a period of some 30 years, the Supreme Court had a great deal of difficulty
with the question of what was, and what was not slight negligence on the part of the
plaintiff. In one volume alone, volume 72 of the Illinois Supreme Court Reports, we
find no less than seven cases dealing with this subject." REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE
STUDYING COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE, ILLINOIS JUDICIAL CONFERENCE (1960); Green,
Illinois Negligence Law, 39 ILL. L. REV. 36, 127-130(1944).
38 150 Ill. 546, 37 N.E. 905 (1894). See City of Lanark v. Dougherty, 153 Ill. 163,
38 N.E. 892 (1894).
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conciling two essentially countervailing doctrines, comparative negligence and
contributory negligence; (3) the failure of the doctrine to provide for appor-
tionment of damages on the basis of fault; and (4) the substantial increase in
the number of master-servant cases, during the 1880's. The court, fearing
that the control of such cases might devolve to the jury, sought to limit any
potential financial burden which might be placed on employers.39
STATUTES OF LIMITED APPLICATION ESPOUSING THE DOCTRINE OF
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
Whatever the arguments over the merits of comparative negligence°4 0 the
fact remains that a good deal of case law involving "special" comparative
negligence statutes has evolved. The injustice worked by the contributory
negligence bar in railroad accidents led to the enactment in 1908 of the Fed-
eral Employers' Liability Act, which applies to all actions brought by inter-
state railroad employees against their employers. 41 The intent of F.E.L.A.
is to grant some recovery for every injury which is caused in any part by
the employer's negligence. 42 In 1930, the United States Supreme Court held 43
that the provisions of the F.E.L.A. were incorporated by reference into the
Merchant Marine Act of 1920. 4 4 At the same time the F.E.L.A. became the
prototype for state legislation protecting intrastate railroad workers, and
other laborers.45
THE COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE STATES
The mid-nineteenth century Illinois doctrine was not what is now under-
stood to be the doctrine of comparative negligence. The modern concept of
39 Green, supra note 37, at 47, 50-51; Maki v. Frelk, 85 Ill. App. 439, 229 N.E.2d 284
(i967).
40 Pro: e.g., Atten, Should Illinois Adopt A Comparative Negligence Statute? 51 ILL.
B.J. 194 (1962) ; Bress, Comparative Negligence: Let Us Harken to the Call of Progress,
43 A.B.A.J. 127 (1957); Eldridge, Contributory Negligence: An Outmoded Defense That
Should Be Abolished, 43 A.B.A.J. 52 (1957). Con: e.g., Burns, Comparative Negligence:
A Law Professor Dissents, 51 ILL. B.J. 708 (1963) ; Varnum, Comparative Negligence in
Automobile Cases, 24 INs. COUN. J. 60 (1957); Powell, Contributory Negligence: A
Necessary Check in the American Jury, 43 A.B.A.J. 1005 (1957).
41 35 Stat. 66 (1908) ; as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 53 (1964).
42 The Supreme Court, in the case of Rodgers v. Missouri Pac. R.R.i 352 U.S. 500, 506-
507 (1952), held that under the FELA, a plaintiff is entitled to recover if the defendant's
negligence "played any part, even the slightest, in producing the injury or death for
which damages are sought." See Philhrick, supra note 30, at 787.
43 Lindgren v. United States, 281 U.S. 38 (1930).
44 41 Stat. 988 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 861 et seq. (1964).
45 See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-806 (1956); Via. CoDE ANN. § 8-642 (1950);
MICH. STAT. ANN. § 17.141 (1960); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4113.07 (PAGE'S 1965).
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comparative negligence involves apportionment of the damages according to
the percentage of causal negligence attributable to each actor. Seven states
have enacted comparative negligence statutes of general application. These
comparative negligence statutes may be divided into three general types.
The "Pure" Form: The Mississippi System
Under the "pure" theory of comparative negligence, contributory negli-
gence, no matter how great, does not bar recovery 4 6 except, in the rare
instance, where such negligence is determined to be the sole proximate cause
of the injury.47 A negligent plaintiff recovers a judgment equal to his total
damages diminished in proportion to the amount of causal negligence at-
tributable to him. Theoretically, a plaintiff 99 per-cent causally negligent can
recover 1 per cent of his damages from the defendant. In 1910, Mississippi
promulgated the first comparative negligence statute, and thus far has been
the only state which has permanently adopted the "pure" form of comparative
negligence.48 Under the Mississippi act, apportionment is required even where
the negligence of the plaintiff exceeds that of the defendant or may be
characterized as "gross" while the defendant's is merely "slight."4 9 Directed
verdicts may only be granted for lack of proximate cause. Contributory negli-
gence, being at most a partial or mitagatory defense, the court, having once
determined mutual negligence which may as a matter of law be considered
a proximate cause, must immediately submit the question to the jury for
comparison and apportionment. 50
46 Crosby Lumber & Mfg. Co. v. Durnham, 181 Miss. 559, 179 So. 285, 854 (1938);
Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Farris, 259 F.2d 445, 67 A.L.R.2d 1358 (5th Cir. 1958).
47 Stewart v. Kroger Grocery Co., 198 Miss. 371, 21 So.2d 912 (1945) ; Danner v.
Mid-State Paving Co., 252 Miss. 776, 173 So. 2d 608 (1965).
48 Miss. LAWS 1910, ch. 135; Miss. CODE ANN. § 1454 (1957) provides: "In all actions
hereafter brought for personal injuries, or where such injuries have resulted in death, or
for injury to property, the fact that the person injured, or the owner of the property, or
person having control over the property may have been guilty of contributory negligence
shall not bar a recovery, but damages shall be diminished by the jury in proportion
to the amount of negligence attributable to the person injured or the owner of the
property, or the person having control over the property." Puerto Rico and the Canal
Zone have also adopted "pure" comparative negligence, supra note 5. See Panama R.R.
v. Davies, 82 F.2d 123 (1936) ; Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 41 CAL. L. REV. 1, 13-14
(1953) ; Institute of Judicial Administration, Comparative Negligence, 7-U58, at 4 (1959).
49 Supra note 47; Shell & Bufkin, Comparative Negligence in Mississippi, 27 Miss. L. J.
105, 112-13 (1955).
50 "The apportionment must be made if negligence of both parties is found, and it is
error not to instruct the jury to make it." PROSSER, supra note 48, at 14; Tindall v. Davis,
129 Miss. 30, 91 So. 701 (1922). Under the modified and the slight-gross forms of com-
parative negligence (discussed infra) the court must, in addition to considering negli-
gence and proximate causality, make a preliminary comparison between the plaintiff's
and defendant's respective quanta of negligence to determine whether as a matter of
law the negligence of the former exceeds that of the latter. Thus, the defendant may
still obtain a directed verdict.
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The jury is instructed to consider the percentage of causal negligence at-
tributable to each party and diminish the plaintiff's recovery or the defen-
dant's counterclaim recovery in proportion to their respective contributing
negligence. The Mississippi courts do not use special verdicts or interroga-
tories, and the jury returns a "lump sum" award. Under such a procedure, any
contention as to how the jury arrived at their verdict or what quantum of
causal negligence, if any, was attributed to the parties in the jury's computa-
tion is purely speculative; and the jury's award will be upheld where there is
any credible evidence to sustain the apportionment. While the Mississippi sys-
tem is a model of comparative negligence in the purest and most comprehen-
sive form, it presents some difficult problems especially in regard to multi-
party suits and multiple counterclaims and set-offs.5 ' For instance, a plaintiff
brings suit against three defendants. The defendants each counterclaim against
the plaintiff and each of the other defendants, and implead a fourth tortfeasor,
not joined in the original complaint, for the purposes of contribution or in-
demnity. Assuming arguendo the jury is able to allocate the percentages of
causal negligence, the mathematics alone of such an apportionment is enough
to confound any jury.52 Another disadvantage of the "pure" system especially
in conjunction with statutes permitting liberal joinder and counterclaim, is
that often after the representative insurance companies take their set-offs
against each other, the injured claimant may be granted a net judgment which
is only a fraction of his total actual damages or perhaps, not be granted
any compensation at all.
53
The Slight-Gross Theory: Nebraska and South Dakota
In 1913, Nebraska enacted a comparative negligence statute. South Dakota,
in 1941, adopted the Nebraska Act verbatim. 54 The statute allows an appor-
51 Under the modified and the slight-gross forms of comparative negligence, counter-
claims and their resultant problem, set-offs, are virtually eliminated. Because these
states (Nebraska, South Dakota, Wisconsin, Maine and perhaps Arkansas) hold that an
injured party can not recover from one whose attributable causal negligence is less than or
equal to his own, any action will necessarily be amenable only to a "one way claim." But
note, in Wisconsin at least, a defendant's counterclaim will be rendered effective by either
the court's determination or the jury's finding that the negligence of the plaintiff is
greater than that of the defendant, and the sole issue in the trial of the counterclaim will
be the amount of the defendant's gross damages. Kirchen v. Tisler, 255 Wis. 208, 38
N.W.2d 514 (1949).
52 But see GREGORY, LEGISLATIVE Loss DISTRIBUTION IN NEGLIGENCE AcTIoNs (1936),
wherein he sets out and solves each of these difficult, but not insolvable, multiple party
problems.
53 See Leflar & Wolfe, Panel on Comparative Negligence and Liability Insurance, 11
ARK. L. REV. 71 (1956).
54 NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1151 (1964) and SM. CODE § 47.0304-1 (Supp. 1960) provides,
"In all actions brought to recover damages for injuries to a person or to his property
caused by the negligence of another, the fact that the plaintiff may have been guilty of
contributory negligence shall not bar recovery when the contributory negligence of the
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tioned recovery notwithstanding contributory negligence where the plaintiff's
negligence is "slight" and the defendant's negligence "gross" in comparison.
The courts of both states are now in accord in rejecting the concept of definite
"bailment-type" degrees of negligence.55 The "slightness" of the plaintiff's
negligence or the respective "grossness" of the defendant's negligence can
only be determined by comparing the two quanta of negligence. For instance,
the Nebraska court has suggested that the ratio of one-to-six might comply
with the statutory requirement that a plaintiff's negligence be slight.5 6 On that
basis, it is theoretically conceivable that the negligence of the plaintiff
quantitatively falls below the failure to exercise ordinary due care, and
nevertheless, might be considered comparatively "slight."
Such liberal construction combined with the provision that "all questions of
negligence are for the jury" would seem to assuage the rather constricting
effect of the "slight-gross" categorization, but this has not been the result.
The courts have frequently barred recovery because a plaintiff's negligence
was more than "slight.15 7 Furthermore, the nebulous terms "slight" and
"gross" have confused juries, led to excessive appeals,58 and, in practice,
limited apportionment to a relatively small number of cases.5 9 Thus, while
there is apportionment on the basis of percentage of total causal negligence
in some cases,6 0 the actual effect of this modern "slight-gross theory" has
plaintiff was slight and the negligence of the defendant was gross in comparison, but the
contributory negligence of the plaintiff shall be considered by the jury in the mitigation
of damages in proportion to the amount of contributory negligence attributable to the
plaintiff, and all question of negligence and contributory negligence are for the jury."
55Hickman v. Parks Construction Co., 162 Neb. 461, 76 N.W.2d 403 (1956), 62
A.L.R.2d 1040 (1958); Sayers v. Witte, 171 Neb. 750, 107 N.W.2d 676 (1961); Murray
v. Pearson Appliance Store, 155 Neb. 860, 54 N.W.2d 250 (1952); Fryda v. Vesely,
80 S.D. 356, 123 N.W.2d 345 (1963); Nugent v. Quam, 152 N.W.2d 371 (1967). See
Comment, 7 S.D. L. REV. 114 (1962).
5 6 Patterson v. Kerr, 127 Neb. 73, 254 N.W. 704 (1934).
57 Allen v. Kavanaugh, 160 Neb. 645, 71 N.W.2d 119 (1955); Rogers v. Shepherd, 159
Neb. 292, 66 N.W.2d 815 (1954); Hughes v. Omaha & Council Bluffs St. Ry. Co., 143
Neb. 47, 8 N.W.2d 509 (1943); Kirchner v. Gast, 169 Neb. 404, 100 N.W.2d 65 (1959);
Kundert v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 70 S.D. 464, 18 N.W.2d 786 (1945); Allen v. Martley, 77
S.D. 133, 87 N.W.2d 355 (1958); Creager v. Al's Construction Co., 75 S.D. 482, 68
N.W.2d 484 (1955); Flanagan v. Slattery, 74 S.D. 92, 49 N.W.2d 27 (1951); Cowan v.
Dean, 81 S.D. 486, 137 N.W.2d 337 (1965); Friese v. Gulbrandson, 69 S.D. 179, 8 N.W.2d
438 (1943) ; Pleinis v. Wilson Storage and Transfer Co., 75 S.D. 397, 66 N.W.2d 68 (1954).
5SSupra note 57; Roberts v. Brown, 72 S.D. 479, 36 N.W.2d 665 (1949). Monasmith
v. Cosden Oil Co., 124 Neb. 327, 331, 246 N.W. 623, 625 (1933) wherein the Nebraska
Supreme Court asserted, "[A]nyone of common sense knows that slight negligence
actually means small or little negligence and gross negligence means just what it indicates,
gross or great negligence."
P9 Prosser, supra note 48, at 19-21.
60 Grubb & Roper, Comparative Negligence, 32 NEB. L. REV. 234 (1952).
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been to mollify the doctrine of contributory negligence so that it is invoked
only when the plaintiff's negligence is something more than "slight."' In
light of the functional purpose of comparative negligence (i.e., alleviating the
hardship of the contributory negligence bar), the Nebraska and South Dakota
version often result in an anomalous situation. In jurisdictions which recog-
nize "degrees" of negligence or those that, in effect, treat gross negligence
as wanton and wilful misconduct, a slightly or ordinarily negligent plaintiff
will recover all his damages from a grossly negligent defendant, 2 but in
Nebraska or South Dakota, he will recover diminished damages or nothing
at all.
The Modified Form: A Growing Trend
Four states have adopted by statute the modified form of comparative
negligence. With the exception of the Arkansas approach, the modified form
permits recovery against each individual defendant only if the negligence of
the defendant exceeds that of the plaintiff. For example, where the injury is
caused by a single tortfeasor, a plaintiff found to be 25 or 49 per cent causally
negligent can recover respectively 75 or 51 per-cent of his total damages, but
a plaintiff found 50 per-cent negligent, or more, cannot recover.
Georgia
At about the same time Justice Breese was enunciating the Illinois "doc-
trine of comparative degrees," the Georgia court had begun the development
of its own rule of comparative negligence. The Georgia doctrine had its origin
in three cases involving railroad accidents decided in the "1850's. ''63 The cod-
ifiers of the Georgia Code of 1860-1862 incorporated the principles of these
cases in two statutes. 64 The first statute,65 though appearing to allow appor-
6 1 See GREGORY, supra note 52, at 61; Philbrick, supra note 13, at 794; Note, 30
N.D. L. REV. 105 (1954).
62Text and notes, supra notes 21-22. In many jurisdictions "gross negligence" is
treated as synonymous to "willful, wanton and reckless misconduct," but even where this
is not the case, the concepts are in operation effectively the same. PROSSER, supra note
17, § 34, at 187, 189.
63 Macon & W. R.R. Co. v. Winn, 19 Ga. 440 (1856), appealed again, 26 Ga.
250 (1858) ; Flanders v. Meath, 27 Ga. 358 (1859) ; Yonge v. Kinney, 28 Ga. 111 (1859).
64 See, Turk, supra note 8, at 326-330; Maloney, From Contributory to Comparative
Negligence: A Needed Law Reform, 11 U. FLA. L. REv. 135, 156 (1958).
05 GA. CODE ANN. § 94-703 (1958) provides: "No person shall recover damages from
a railroad company for injury to himself or his property, where the same is done by his
consent or is caused by his own negligence. If the complainant and the agents of the
company are both at fault, the former may recover, but the damages shall be diminished
by the jury in proportion to the amount of fault attributable to him."
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tionment only for injuries arising out of railroading accidents, was first ex-
tended to all negligence actions by rather remarkable judicial interpretation,6"
and then limited in operation to cases where the plaintiff's negligence is less
than that of the defendant. 67 This limitation has been held to apply also in
multiple defendant situations. The injured person cannot recover from any one
defendant whose fault is less than or equal to his own, although each and all
defendants found more negligent will be jointly and severally liable for the
entire judgment.68
The second statute,6 9 which had been applied in conjunction with the com-
parative negligence rule, has engrafted upon the latter's application what has
been described as a "reverse" last clear chance doctrine. 70 In summary, ap-
portioned recovery is allowed where the plaintiff's lesser negligence concurred
proximately with the defendant's greater negligence to cause his injury, but
if a defendant's negligence is antecedent and the plaintiff, (a) knowing of the
potential hazard, fails to exercise due care in avoiding the injury, or (b) negli-
gently fails to discover the hazard, he will be barred from recovery.
71
Arkansas
In 1955, the Arkansas Legislature enacted a "pure" comparative negligence
statute.7 2 After only two years in force, the legislature, finding the "pure"
66Elk Cotton Mills v. Grant, 140 Ga. 727, 79 S.E. 836 (1913); Wynne v. Southern
Bell Telephone Company, 159 Ga. 623, 126 S.E. 388 (1925) ; Barnett v. Whatley, 87 Ga.
App. 860, 75 S.E.2d 667 (1953) ; Wright v. Concrete Co. 107 Ga. App. 190, 129 S.E.2d 351
(1962).
67 Christian v. Macon Railroad Co., 120 Ga. 314, 47 S.E. 923 (1904); Lime Cola
Bottling Co. v. Atlanta & W.P.R.R., 34 Ga. App. 104, 128 S.E. 226 (1925).
68Mishoe v. Davis, 64 Ga. App. 700, 14 S.E.2d 187 (1941); Reynolds v. Rentz, 98
Ga. App. 4, 104 S.E.2d 608 (1958); Wilson v. Harrell, 87 Ga. App. 793, 75 S.E.2d 436
(1953).
69GA. CODE ANN. § 105-603 (1956) provides: "If the plaintiff by ordinary care
could have avoided the consequences to himself caused by the defendant's negligence,
he is not entitled to recover. In other cases the defendant is not relieved, although the
plaintiff may in some way have contributed to the injury sustained."
70 Prosser, supra note 48, at 28. See Western & A.R.R. v. Ferguson, 113 Ga. 708,
39 S.E. 306 (1901); Ga. So. & Fla. R.R. v. Haygood, 103 Ga. App. 381, 119 S.E.2d 277
(1961); Smith v. American Oil Co., 77 Ga. App. 463, 49 S.E.2d 90 (1948).
71 Supra note 70.
72 "Sec. 1-In all actions hereafter accruing for negligence resulting in personal injuries
or wrongful death or injury to property, including those in which the defendant has
had the last clear chance to avoid the injury, the contributory negligence of the person
injured, or of the deceased, or of the owner of the property, or of the person having
control over the property, shall not bar recovery, but the damages awarded shall be
diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to the injured person




statute had not been applied uniformly and had created "great confusion,""
repealed it and substituted instead a "modified" comparative negligence
statute.74 The 1955 Act, modeled after a draft proposed by Dean Prosser,75
seems to have been generally accepted by both judges and lawyers, and, as
far as can be discerned from objective studies, had created no great upheaval
in the procedural or substantive areas of negligence law.76 There is good
reason to believe that insurance lobbyists constituted the main pressure for
the change. 77
Sec. 2-In any action to which section one of this act applies, the Court shall make find-
ings of fact or the jury shall return a special verdict which shall state:
(a) The amount of the damages which would have been recoverable if there had been
no contributory negligence; and
(b) The extent to which such damages are diminished by reason of contributory
negligence.
Sec. 3-All laws or parts of laws in conflict with this Act are hereby repealed."
(Ark. Acts 1955, No. 191)
Under section 2, a special verdict procedure was made mandatory, and under section 3,
the doctrine of last clear chance was nullified. See Garner, Comparative Negligence and
Discovered Peril, 10 AaK. L. REV. 72 (1955); Comment, 30 Mo. L. REV. 137, 142 (1965).
73 The Arkansas Legislature declared, "[Tlhere is a lack of understanding and uni-
formity on the application of the so-called 'Comparative Negligence' statute . . . and
that with the law in its present state, great confusion and unfairness occurs (sic) in
the trial of negligence cases, and emergency (sic) is declared to exist, and (the new
Act) shall take effect ... from and after the date of its passage." Ark. Acts 1957, No. 296,
sec. 4. See Note, 11 ARK. L. REV. 391.
74 ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-1730.1, 2 (1962) provides:
"Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery of damages for any injury, property
damage or death where negligence of the person injured or killed is of less degree than
negligence of any person, firm, or corporation causing such damage.
In all actions hereafter accruing for negligence resulting in personal injuries or wrongful
death or injury to property, contributory negligence shall not prevent a recovery
where any negligence of the person so injured, damaged, or killed is of less degree than
any negligence of the person, firm, or corporation causing such damage; provided that
where such contributory negligence is shown on the part of the person injured, damaged,
or killed, the amount of the recovery shall be diminished in proportion to such con-
tributory negligence."
Although there is no mention of the doctrine of last clear chance in the 1957 act, there
is no indication it will be revived. There is no provision for the special verdict and
it is no longer required but optional upon any party's request, under § 27-1741.2.
75 See Prosser, supra note 48, at 37-38.
76 See Rosenburg, Comparative Negligence in Arkansas: A "Before and After" Survey,
13 ARK. L. REV. 89 (1959), wherein the author concludes that the 1955 Act brought
perceptible changes to personal injury litigation, but did not impose any drastic burden
on the court or create any state of emergency. Regarding the 1957 Act, the bench and
bar generally approved the "lesser negligence" requirement, but objected to the elimina-
tion of the mandatory special verdict.
77 See Gilmore, Comparative Negligence from a Viewpoint of Casualty Insurance,
10 ARK. L. REV. 82 (1955); Schroeder, Negligence Claims-What To Do About Excessive
Awards and Unmeritatious Claims Which Work Against the Public Interest, 8 DEF. L.J.
91, 94-95 (1960) ; 2 ViLL. L. REV. 474, 475 (1957).
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Whatever the reason, it is clear that ih6 couits did not share the legislature's
belief that the "Prosser Act" had created "Igreat confusion and unfairness."
in Walton v. Tull,7 8 considered five years after the "modified" act had gone
into effect, the Arkansas Supreme Court was faced with a multiple defendant
situation in which the lower court had refused to allow the plaintiff to
recover against one of the defendants only equally negligent. Whilb the 1957
Act appears to require that each "person, firm, or corporatioh"7 9 be found
more negligent than the injured person (and the Wisconsin and Georgia courts
have imposed such an interpretation upon their "modified" statutes), the
supreme court held the plaintiff was not barred from recovering his appor-
tioned damages from a joint defendant whose negligence was equal to his
own. The court further suggested: "We are not convinced that the legislature
meant to go any farther than to deny recovery to a plaintiff whose own negli-
gence was at least 50 percent of the cause of his damages." 80
If the dictum of Walton is followed, the net effect will be something of a
compromise between the "modified" and "pure" operation of comparative
negligence in multiple defendant situations. For example, a plaintiff found
40 per-cent contributorily negligent would recover from anyone, or all, of three
joint defendants found each 20 per-cent negligent, but (contrary to the pure
operation) if he is 50 per-cent negligent, or more, he would not recover.
In the common situation where there is only one tortfeasor, the Walton
case has not been interpreted as altering the "modified" operation. A plaintiff
is precluded from recovering any damages, if the plaintiff's causal negligence
is greater than or equal to that of the sole defendant-tortfeasor.8 l
Wisconsin
A "modified" form of comparative negligence has existed in Wisconsin
since its statutory adoption in 1931.82 The statute has been interpreted as
imposing upon recovery the limitation that a plaintiff's negligence be less
than each individual defendant, and where the injured person is found
equally negligent or more, he is precluded from recovery. The doctrine of
78 234 Ark. 882, 356 S.W.2d 20, 8 A.L.R.3d 708 (1962).
7 9 Supra note 74.
80 Supra note 78 at 893, 356 S.W.2d at 26, 8 A.L.R.3d at 718.
81 Sunday v. Burk, 172 F. Supp. 722 (1959); Wagnon v. Barker, 236 Ark. 55, 364
S.W.2d 314 (1963).
82 Wis. Stat. Ann. 895.045 (1966) (formerly § 331.045) provides: "Contributory
Negligence shall not bar recovery in an action by any person or his legal repre-
sentative to recover damages for negligence resulting in death or injury to person
or property, if such negligence was not as great as the negligence of the person
against whom recovery is sought, but any damages allowed shall be diminished in
the proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to the person recovering."
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last clear chance had been abolished in 1925.83 The conceptual purgation
was completed in 1962 by interment of the doctrines of assumption of
risk8 4 and gross negligence,8 5 and the establishment of a contribution rule
allowing recovery in proportion to the percentage causal negligence attribut-
able to the third party defendant.86 These changes in conjunction with the
pervasive use of the special verdict have brought about a relatively uniform
and smooth-working system of loss distribution on the basis of fault.
The Growing Trend
Even authorities who generally favor comparative negligence have criticized
the "modified" approach. It has been labeled the "restatement" of the doctrine
of contributory negligence in more liberal terms, 7 explainable only as the
obvious result of political compromise and expediency. 8 Theoreticians have
ardently pointed out the patent dissymmetry of a system which allows a
plaintiff, 49 per-cent negligent, to recover 51 per-cent of his damages, yet
bars completely a plaintiff found one per-cent more negligent. 89 In a recent
case before the Wisconsin Supreme Court,90 Chief Justice Hollows, concurring
in his own per curiam opinion in order to recommend that the Wisconsin
"modified" statute9' be amended to allow recovery whether the negligence
of the plaintiff "be less than or more than 50 per-cent of the total, '9 2 ob-
served: "There is nothing magic about being equally at fault so that one
should lose all and the other win all." 93 Nevertheless, perhaps for those very
imperfections, "modified" comparative negligence has succeeded in state legis-
latures (Georgia, Wisconsin, Arkansas and Maine) as a compromise with
83 Switzer v. Detroit Investment Co., 188 Wis. 330, 206 N.W. 407 (1925). The fact
that a defendant had a "last clear chance" to avoid the injury is now merely a fault
to be weighed by the jury with other faults in comparing percentages of causal negligence.
See Philbrick, supra note 13, at 809-810.
84 McConville v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 15 Wisc. 2d. 374, 113 N.W.2d 14
14 (1962) ; Colson v. Rule, 15 Wis. 2d 387, 113 N.W.2d 21 (1962).
85 Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1,114 N.W.2d 105 (1962).
86 Id.
87 Campbell, Wisconsin Law Governing Automobile Accidents, [1962) Wis. L. REv.
557, 569; Lawyer v. City of Park Falls, 35 Wis. 2d 308, 151 N.W.2d 68,72 (1967); and
by those opposed, Varnum, Comparative Negligence in Automobile Cases, 24 INs. CouN.
J. 60, 61 (1957).
88 PROSSER, supra note 48, at 25.
89 See Knoeller, Review of Wisconsin Comparative Negligence Act-Suggested Amend-
ments, 41 MARQ. L. REv. 397, 415-17 (1958); Comment, 30 Mo. L. REv. 137, 139 (1965).
90 Lawyer v. City of Park Falls, supra note 87.
91 Supra note 82.
92 Lawyer v. City of Park Falls, supra note 87, at 316, 151 N.W.2d at 72.
93 Supra note 87, at 316, 151 N.W.2d at 72.
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powerful insurance interests0 4 where the "pure" form would have failed. In
1965, the Maine Legislature passed a "modified" statute,95 modeled in part
after the English Contributory Negligence ActY6
THE FUTURE OF COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
Although the Illinois experience with "modified" comparative negligence
was extremely short-lived, the automobile accident crisis continues to demand
a change. 97 For, the contributory negligence bar is far from dead: In practice,
94 Supra note 77. "[Ilt is an open secret that the chief resistance to the comparative
negligence reform is from the insurance lobbies." Lambert, The Case for Comparative
Negligence, 2 Tr. Law. Q. 16 (1965). This is explainable by the fact that comparative
negligence either reduces the scope of or eliminates completely the most potent defense
of the insurance counsel, the directed verdict. Under the "modified" form, a directed
verdict may still be obtained and the Wisconsin court, for one, has made this very clear.
Quady v. Sickl, 260 Wis. 348, 51 N.W.2d 3 (1952) ; Kornetzke v. Calumet County, 8
Wis. 2d 363, 99 N.W.2d 125 (1959); McNally v. Goodenough, 5 Wis. 2d 293,92 N.W.2d
890 (1958).
95M.. REv. STAT. ANN., tit. 14, § 156 (supp. 1966) provides: "Where any person
suffers death or damage as a result of his own fault and partly of the fault of
any other person or persons, a claim in respect of that death or damage shall not
be defeated by reason of the fault of the person suffering the damage, but the damages
recoverable in respect thereof shall be reduced to such extent as the jury thinks just
and equitable having regard to the claimant's share in the responsibility for the damage.
Where damages are recoverable by any person by virtue of this section subject to such
reduction as is mentioned, the jury shall find and record the total damages which would
have been recoverable if the claimant had not been at fault and the extent to which
those damages are to be reduced.
Fault means negligence, breach of statutory duty or other act or omission which gives
rise to a liability in tort or would, apart from this section, give rise to the defense
of contributory negligence.
If such claimant is found by the jury to be equally at fault, the claimant shall not
recover."
A statute relating to damages for tortious conduct of charitable corporations (Me.
Pub. Laws 1965, ch. 383) was also originally enacted as § 156 of title 14, but subse-
quently repealed (ME. PUB. LAws 1966, ch. 513, § 27) and reenacted as § 158 of the
same title. The comparative negligence statute has not been repealed. However, to the
present date, only one case (supra note 23) concerning that statute has as yet reached
the appellate courts. See, Comment, 18 Me. L. Rev. 65 (1966).
96 The Maine Act is substantially identical to the English Law Reform (Contributory
Negligence) Act of 1945, except that the phrase, "reduced to such extent as the jury
thinks just and equitable" in the Maine Statute concerns "the court" not the jury in
the English Act. The English Act is a "pure" type of statute and imposes no limitation
in cases of equal negligence, the limitation in the Maine Act being, more or less, appended
to the English Statute's language. English Law Reform Act of 1945, 8 and 9 GEO. 6,
c. 28.
97 See CRIsis IN CAR INSURANCE (1968).
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it still produces harsh and unjust results, 98 and its application promotes a
disrespect for the workings of "justice" that instinctively compels jurors to
seek a compromise solution.9 9 As Mr. Justice Ward, dissenting in Maki, con-
cludes, the tenability of the majority's opinion "should not preclude this
court from assuming" its "judicial responsibility."100 The precedents of
Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District,'' where the court renun-
ciated the doctrine of school district immunity, and Suvada v. White Motor
Company,10 2 where the same court abolished the requirements of privity and
negligence in product liability cases, stand in mute testimony to the ineffacacy
of the majority's argument. In answering the respondent's arguments in
Suvada that "such far-reaching change" must come from the legislature, the
State Supreme Court quoted its earlier decision in Molitor.
The doctrine of school district immunity [privity and negligence] was created
by this court alone. Having found that doctrine to be unsound and unjust under
present conditions, we consider that we have not only the power, but the duty
to abolish that immunity. . . . 'We closed our courtroom doors without legis-
lative help, and we can likewise open them. 103
98 For some recent Illinois cases in which plaintiffs have been barred by contributory
negligence, see, e.g., Kimovich v. Crutcher, 57 Ill. App. 2d 444, 206 N.E.2d 723 (1965);
Carter v. Winter, 32 Ill. 2d 275, 204 N.E.2d 755, cert. denied 382 U.S. 825 (1966)
Zebell v. Saufnauer, 38 I1. App. 2d 289,187 N.E.2d 320 (1962); Brandenburg v. Weaver
Mfg. Co., 77 Ill. App. 2d 374, 222 N.E.2d 348 (1966). Hession v. Liberty Asphalt
Products, Inc., 235 N.E.2d 17 (11. App. 1968); Tompkins v. Twin Oaks Dairy, 91
Ill. App. 2d 88, 234 N.E.2d 403 (1968); Ferrel v. Chicago Transit Authority, 33 Ill.
App. 2d 321, 179 N.E.2d 410 (1961).
99See supra notes 28-30, text and notes; James, Sufficiency of Evidence and Jury-
Control Devices Available Before Verdict, 47 VA. L. REv. 218 (1961). In Wisconsin, proba-
bly as much a result of the comprehensive use of the special verdict as the abolition of con-
tributory negligence, juries have apparently found it much easier to conscientiously follow
instructions, and have frequently denied recovery in very close cases. See, e.g., Van
Wie v. Hill, 15 Wis. 2d 98, 112 N.W.2d 168 (1961) [P = 51%, D = 49%]; Ivy v.
Tower Ins. Co., 32 Wis. 2d 231, 145 N.W.2d 214 (1966) [P = 50%, D = 50%]; Donahue
v. Western Casualty & Surety Co., 268 Wis. 193, 67 N.W.2d 265 (1954) [P = 51%,
D = 49%]; Frankland v. Peterson, 268 Wis. 394, 67 N.W.2d 865 (1955) [P = 50%,
D = 50%].
100 Maki v. Frelk, 239 N.E.2d 445, 450 (Ill. 1968). See Maki v. Frelk, 85 Ill. App. 2d
439, 229 N.E.2d 284, 291 (1967); Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist., 18 Ill. 2d
11, 26, 163 N.E.2d 89, 96 (1959), wherein the court asserts emphatically: "[Wlhen it
appears that public policy and social needs require a departure from prior decisions, it is
our duty as a court of last resort to overrule these decisions and establish a rule con-
sonant with our present day concept of right and justice."
10118 I1. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 968 (1960).
10232 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965).
103 Id. at 623, 210 N.E.2d at 188 (1965), quoting from Molitor, 18 Ill. 2d 11, 25, 163
N.E.2d 89, (1959). Also requoted by Justice Ward in his dissent, Maki v. Frelk, supra
note 100, at 450-451.
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
Contributory negligence is the bedfellow of school district immunity and
the privity-negligence requirements in product liability cases. It is an out-
moded and anachronistic rule, hanging together by the mere force of stare
decisis and insurance lobbies.' 0 4 The legislature has consistently refused to
enact or even give adequate consideration to reform bills. Nevertheless, the
rule of contributory negligence has not as yet been generally adopted (so as
to be enacted) by any statute.10 The contributory negligence bar originated
in the courts and was judicially adopted and perpetuated in Illinois. There-
fore, the Illinois Supreme Court has the power and the duty to finally de-
capitate the doctrine. 10 6 If the legislature cannot face up to modest reform,
and the court, in its self-imposed impotence, cannot overturn a judge-made
rule, then they may later have to accept a more radical automobile negligence
insurance plan.10 7
CONCLUSION
Comparative negligence is no maverick doctrine that has arisen out of the
minds of Machiavelian personal injury lawyers or well-intentioned ("but in-
experienced") compensation-oriented scholars. Its history is at least as long
104 To comprehend the undue influence that lobbyists may exercise on legislators, see
Sen. P. Simon, The Illinois Legislature-A Study of Corruption, HARPER'S, Sept., 1964,
at 74.
105 While the majority in Maki v. Frelk, supra note 100, at 447, points out "that the
General Assembly has incorporated the present doctrine of contributory negligence in
statutes dealing with a number of particular subjects" (e.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 24,
§§ 1-4-5, 1-4-6, 1-4-4; ch. 121, §§ 385-86; ch. 70, § 2 [1967]), it is clear that there has
been no general legislative enactment of the doctrine. If there would be such an enact-
ment, the court could not even consider abrogating the rule unless the contributory
negligence bar were found unconstitutional. See Maki v. Frelk, supra note 100, at 450
(Ward's dissent); Comment, Judicial Adoption of a Comparative Negligence Rule in
Illinois, (1968) ILL. L.F. 351, 358. However, there is reason to fear that the legislature,
now apprised of the threat to the rule, will generally enact the doctrine. Shortly after
the supreme court's decision in Molitor (supra note 101), the legislature passed a series
of statutes restoring prior immunities of some institutions and partly restoring im-
munities of school districts and nonprofit private schools. See Comment, Governmental
Immunity in Illinois: The Molitor Decision and the Legislative Reaction, 54 Nw. U.L.
REv. 588, 597 (1959).
16 See Keeton, Creative Continuity in the Law of Torts, 75 HARV. L. REV. 463, 476
(1962).
107 Keeton and O'Connell have proposed a "basic protection auto insurance package"
which would eliminate all personal injury actions under $15,000. Companies would pay
out to their own policy holders up to $5,000 for the "pain and suffering" and up to
$10,000 for other damages (e.g., medical expenses, lost wages) without any consideration
as to who was at fault. Where damages exceeded this amount, an action would be
preserved to recover the excess. KEETON & O'CONNELL, AFTER CARS CRASH-THE NEED FOR
LEGAL AND INSURANCE REFORM (1967); KEETON & O'CONNELL, Basic Protection Auto-
mobile Insurance, CRISIS IN CAR INSURANCE 40-93 (1968).
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